One China Policy and Its Impact on U.S.-China Relations: The Taiwan Experience

By

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Abstract

The paper investigated the One China Policy and its Impact on U.S.-China Relations with an emphasis on Taiwan. The One China policy is one of the most lingering issues in the international system. The People's Republic of China (PRC) sees China including Taiwan as a single entity but the Republic of China (ROC) sees Taiwan as an independent entity. The struggle to unify China under one entity has not materialized despite the recognition of China as a single entity by the United Nations (UN). The United States (U.S.) has continued to treat Taiwan as an independent territory with massive support; military and trade despite acknowledging that there are no two Chinas. This massive support from the U.S. has further strained the relations that existed between the U.S. and China. The political realism was adopted as the theoretical framework. Secondary sources of data were deployed for the study; it involves the collection of data from textbooks, magazines conference papers etc. The study observed that though the U.S. recognized only the PRC as the legitimate government in China but still provided massive support; military and trade to Taiwan. The study recommends that the U.S. should cooperate with other countries in the global community to reiterate the position of the United Nations (UN) as it regards One China. This will douse tension over the territory

Keywords: Policy, One China, Taiwan, National Interest, Dispute

Introduction

Foreign policy is the main spectrum of planned activities or step-by-step procedures geared towards achieving formulated goals. According to Obi (2009; p.42), foreign policy "denotes a pattern of values expressed through government authoritative statements to give a sense of the goals, objectives, hopes and aspirations of the issuing country in relations with other countries". It is a pattern through which nations relate with each other for the purpose of promoting and protecting their national interest. However, to ensure the maximum protection of the interest of a nation, nations- are on the move to improve upon their power-base in dealing with other nations. This became necessary as a result of the self-help nature of global relations in which the gain of one nation-state can be the loss of another nation. This is why Emeka (1992; p.12), postulates that "the foreign policy of a nation is intended at manipulating the global community with the power at the disposal of the nation to actualize the national objectives of that nation". National interest therefore is the hallmark of foreign policy of every nation. More importantly, the interdependent nature of the global system makes it imperative for states to interact because no state is an island of its own. This forms the bedrock of US-China relations predicated on national interest. James (2019) noted that current Sino-American discussions have sought to restore the networks of communication between Beijing and Washington that have frayed since the Trump administration. If these determinations are to have any achievement, a route must be found to ease the tensions in the Taiwan Strait that are frightening the peace in the area.

One significant step that might be taken by the United States to achieve this end would be a return to the policy that has, in the past, guided its approach in the area — the "One China" policy (James, 2019).

The One China policy is the cornerstone of the diplomatic relations between the United States (US), China and Taiwan. The policy acknowledges the Chinese position that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China. The One China policy has been a sensitive issue in US-China relations. The US officially recognizes the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate government of China and acknowledges the position that Taiwan is part of China. This has been a key element in maintaining stable relations between the US and China. As noted by

Ted-Galen (2014) despite constant declarations, the U.S. One China policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat unclear and subject to different clarifications. Apart from questions about what the policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. It is pertinent to note that the PRC conceive Taiwan as an integral aspect of China but Taiwan sees her territory as an independent entity. Although the U.S. and the United Nations have consistently maintained that Taiwan is an integral part of the PRC (One China Policy), the U.S. has conducted relations; trade and supply of technical assistance to Taiwan over the years. For instance, the United States, in September 2023 announced a weapons aid package worth up to $345 million to Taiwan. Also, in December of that same year, approved a $500 million sale to Taiwan of infrared search and track systems for F-16 fighter jets, as well as other equipment (U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, 2023). This again has raised concern about the status of Taiwan in the global community. The PRC has vowed to ensure that Taiwan maintains its status as an integral part of the PRC.

The PRC has vowed to unify the territory as a single entity without denouncing the use of force when necessary. For instance, questions about the One China policy arose after Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui categorized cross-strait relations as "special state-to-state ties" on July 9, 1999. Beijing responded strongly with calls for Lee to retract the perceived deviance from the One China position and echoed long-standing threats to use force if necessary to prevent a declaration of independence by Taiwan. The PRC also opposed U.S. military intervention. As stated by Richard (2019), the PRC has never relinquished its claimed right to use force in what it sees as an internal problem and has voiced more plainly and demonstrated clearly its readiness to use force for political if not military objectives—despite its announced policy of peaceful unification. Since the early 1990s, the PRC has procured advanced arms from the Soviet Union/Russia and built up its missile force. In December 1992 and March 1993, top PRC rulers Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng warned of "drastic" or "resolute" measures to prevent Taiwan's independence.

In the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, the PRC launched provocative military exercises, including missile test-firings, to express anger with President Lee Teng-

hui's private visit to the United States and to frighten voters before Taiwan's first democratic presidential election. Recently, the PRC operations have increased since 2022, when the then-speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, visited Taiwan. As noted by Sherrod et al (2023), Beijing does not accept visits by foreign political classes to Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing believes that such visits would be tantamount to recognizing the government in Taipei. Shortly after Pelosi's visit, mainland China carried out its largest-ever military exercises around Taiwan, firing ballistic missiles and installing fighter jets and naval vessels in a substantial show of force. China has increased the frequency and scale of patrols of PLA bombers, fighter jets, and surveillance aircraft over and around Taiwan. It has also progressively sailed its warships and aircraft carriers through the Taiwan Strait in shows of force. Taiwan has reported that thousands of cyberattacks from China target its government agencies every day (BBC, 2023). These attacks have soared in recent years. In 2020, Taipei accused four Chinese groups of hacking into at least ten Taiwanese government agencies and six thousand official email accounts since 2018 just to access government data and personal information. Beijing has also used non-military measures to pressure Taiwan. In 2016, China suspended a cross-strait communication mechanism with the main Taiwan liaison office. It restricted tourism to Taiwan, and the number of mainland tourists visiting Taiwan fell from a high of over 4 million in 2015 to 2.7 million in 2019 (Robert, 2020).

The objectives of the study are; to examine the origin of the One China policy and the dispute over Taiwan; and analyze the impact of one China policy on US-China relations.

Apart from this introduction, this paper is divided into four parts. Part one focuses on methodology and theoretical framework, part two focuses on literature review, part three focuses on data analysis and part four focuses on conclusion and recommendations.

PART I

Methodology

This study adopted a secondary method of data collection; it involves the collection of data from textbooks, seminar papers, journal and conference papers etc. Content analysis was utilized in analyzing the data

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework adopted for the study is the Political Realism Theory. The theory posits that the nature of man is sinful, conflictual and competitive. It conceived states as rational units or entities striving to actualize their national interest. It takes as its assumption that power is (or ought to be) the primary end of political action, whether in the domestic or international arena. In the domestic arena, the theory asserts that states do, or should, strive to maximize their power, whilst on the international stage; nation-states are seen as the primary agents that maximize, or ought to maximize, their power. The theory was propounded by several scholars such as Hans J. Morgenthau, Carr, Waltz, Thucydides etc. According to Hans Morgenthau (1978; p. 56), "the interest of the state defined in terms of power, is the primary moral guide by which policies are developed, but prudence in pursuing those interests is the primary ethical guide for policymakers". In the world of power politics, states must increase their power to guarantee their survival.

The origin of political realism can be traced to the writing of Thomas Hobbes in his postulations on the state of nature. For Hobbes, the state of nature was analogous to the state of war as there was no property ownership, morality or laws. Might was seen as right as only the strong survive. Later on, Machiavelli demonstrates the relevance of power by individuals and the state. Machiavelli can be classified as one of the leading proponents of historical realism. He advocates a set of ideas which permit nation-state leaders to bring the external environment under their control. Also, Carr (1976), contended that nations of power must advocate for a foreign policy which recognized the interplay of power and morality, force and appeasement. It is his idea that brutal force alone cannot keep and control any population in a state of perpetual submissiveness to authority. Thucydides presents power politics as a law of human behaviour, he uses the "Melian dialogue", one episode of the Peloponnesian war to express the realist

view of some key ideas such as self-interest, alliances, balance of power, capabilities and insecurity. Morgenthau (1978) elevated these principles to an unprecedented height in post-World War II academic discussion. To him, nations must control other nations by force, acquire territories by force and must not have any moral consideration in respect of Justice, fairness and common interest.

Relating and applying political realism in understanding the impact of One China relations on U.S.-China relations with regard to Taiwan, it becomes imperative to state that both China and the U.S. have specific interests in Taiwan. China sees Taiwan as an extension of its territory to help consolidate its powers in the global system why the U.S. is indirectly aiding Taiwan to continue to retain its global status. If China has control over Taiwan, it will further strengthen China which can become a further threat to the U.S. in the global system and her allies such as Japan in the region. Thus, the need to actualize certain national interests forms the locus of understanding the One China policy and defines the relations between the U.S. and China.

PART II
LITERATURE REVIEW
One China Policy

Henry (2012) stated that the "One China policy" is not the "One China" principle by which Beijing claims that Taiwan is an absolute part of China. As noted by Henry, the humblest definition of the "One China" policy of the United States is that it acknowledged the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the only, legitimate government of China in 1979 (Henry, 2012). Still, this is inadequate. Since the spring of 1979 when Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, the scope of the "One China" policy has significantly widened. The Act itself was envisioned to supplement the PRC's respect with a promise to a continued "unofficial association with the people of Taiwan and an appearance of concern regarding coercions from China (House International Relations Committee, 2014). Provisions for likely support for the island on an occasion of such a possibility were also made. Along with the terms of recognition, it outlined a policy to be practised concerning both sides of the Taiwan Strait — that is, not only China but also Taiwan. In other words, it should more properly be called a "cross-strait policy" (House International Relations Committee, 2014).

The most important elements of that policy with regard to China as gleaned from the House International Relations Committee (2014) were:

i. The recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China;
ii. The acknowledgement but not acceptance of the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China (Beijing's "One China" principle);
iii. The expectation that any solution to cross-Strait differences would be resolved peacefully.

Regarding the policy toward Taiwan as gleaned from the House International Relations Committee (2014), the elements were:

i. The termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty; Washington continued to define the status of the island of Taiwan as "undetermined," with the ruling government not considered to be a sovereign state in the international system;
ii. The United States reserved the right to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people in Taiwan;
iii. There was a provision for the president and Congress to consult on further action in the event of a threat to Taiwan.

National Interest

National interest is not only the key concept in foreign policy but also is a guide to foreign policy formulation. The history of the concept of national interest dates back to the time when the evolution of the modern state system took place. It was and remains an important element to describe the underlying rationale for the behaviour of states and statesmen in a threatening international environment. But the idea of separateness, of differentness from others, and the consequent idea of preserving and protecting one's values against others, goes back to antiquity. The word "interest" derives from the Latin, meaning "it concerns, it makes a difference to, it is important with reference to some person or thing".

Charles (2009) was of the opinion that territory and commerce are fundamental aspects of national interest. Hans Morgenthau (1978) defined national interest as the survival of a political unit in its identity as the irreducible minimum of a state's interest vis-a-vis other units, encompassing in this the integrity of a state's territory, its political institutions, and its culture. The prime concern of the nation may be the security of the nation and its people and protecting the values and cultures. It is often believed that there is an irreducible core of national interest for any state at any given time. This is called the vital interest of a nation. The vital interest is that in which, if necessary, states are prepared to go to war. In other words, the vital interest is one which is so important for a state that it is normally willing to go to war immediately or ultimately in order to safeguard that interest (Charles, 2009). The vital interest of a country is supposed to be so basic that it is often regarded as permanent. Hence, it is also supposed to be primary to which all other aspects of the national interest remain subordinated. The vital character of national interest invariably has an emotional appeal to the people. Such vital interests include for all states, as a minimum, the protection and preservation of their independence and territorial integrity. This is paramount to every state as states are willing to pay the supreme price in most cases for the defence of their territorial integrity.

PART III

Origin of the One China Policy and the Dispute over Taiwan

Taiwan officially calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), locating its political lineage to the ROC established in 1912 after the revolution that began on October 10, 1911, in China that overthrew the Qing Dynasty (Bush, 2006). As noted by Bush (2006), the ROC deployed on October 10 to observe the national day, renowned as "Double Ten". The ROC does not recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) established in Beijing by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1949. The PRC claims that the ROC stopped to exist in 1949 and that Taiwan is a province of one China (the Qing Empire had unified Taiwan as a complete province in 1885-1895 when more settlers moved from China to the island). The PRC and ROC do not recognize each other or two China. The ROC refers to the other side of the strait as the "mainland". The PRC opposes recognition of the ROC and seeks unification of Taiwan with the mainland as a part of one China, without

forsaking the use of force (Bush, 2006). In any case, since 1949, the ROC has administered only Taiwan, and the PRC has governed mainland China.

Carpenter (2006) in his account, stated that formerly called Formosa; Taiwan had never been ruled by the PRC and until 1945, had never been governed by the ROC. In Taiwan after World War II, October 25, 1945, or "the Retrocession Day as fondly called", manifested the ROC's claim of recovering Formosa from Japan. However, upon Japan's capitulation, that was the first time that the ROC's military forces had occupied the island of Formosa. When the Qing Empire surrendered in eternity Formosa to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, the ROC was not yet in reality (Carpenter, 2006). Moreover, the people in the colony did not have a say in the self-determination of their status or identity. The Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party of China, has contended that the ROC claimed Formosa at Japan's submission in August 1945, with no country contesting the island's status (Carpenter, 2006). The ROC under KMT forces led by Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taipei in 1949, when the Communist forces led by Mao Zedong took over mainland China. Carpenter (2006) submitted that Taiwan's people have faced social, ethnic, linguistic, and political issues of whether to identify with Taiwan or China, with two major groups of local "Taiwanese" and "Mainlanders" (people who withdrew to Taiwan with the KMT forces and their offspring).

Copper (2007) averred that before and during World War II, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao Zedong, and the Nationalist Party (KMT), led by Chiang Kai-shek, were fighting for control of China. The U.S. backed the KMT but eventually stopped giving it military aid, and in 1949 Mao proclaimed the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Chiang fled to Taiwan, carrying two million KMT troops and followers with him, and announcing Taipei as the provisional capital of the Republic of China. For two eras after 1949, global players, including the U.S. and the U.N., considered Taiwan to be the PRC. But in 1971, the U.N. voted to admit the People's Republic of China (mainland China) and to expel the Republic of China (Taiwan) (Copper, 2007). In 1979, the U.S. transformed its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to mainland China.

Shirk (2007) noted that in February 2000, on a day before another presidential election in Taiwan, the PRC delivered its second White Paper on Taiwan,

reaffirming the peaceful amalgamation policy but adding a new prerequisite for the use of force if the need arise. As one of three Ifs, the PRC warned that even if Taiwan indefinitely declines to negotiate a peaceful settlement, the PRC would be obliged to use force to achieve unification. No limit was issued. The White Paper warned the United States not to shift arms to Taiwan or pursue any form of cooperation with Taiwan, including assistance in missile defence (Shirk, 2007). Before the presidential election in 2004, a PRC official on Taiwan matters who was a PLA major general issued a warning, on November 18, 2003, to use force against what Beijing sees as the "open promotion of Taiwan independence". Deputy Secretary of United States Richard Armitage replied by saying that "there's an election and campaign going on in Taiwan, and I think one shouldn't over-emphasize comments that are made in the heat of an election" (BBC, 2004) and that the United States has full faith that the question of Taiwan will be resolved peacefully.

China regards the island 90 miles (145 kilometres) off its coast as a renegade province, and President Xi Jinping highlighted the issue at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Though Xi said he desires amalgamation by peaceful means, his objective was clear, and he did not rule out the use of power (James, 2019). Meanwhile, in Taiwan, the share of the populace recognised as solely Taiwanese continues to surpass the number that identifies as both Chinese and Taiwanese.

At the global level, at its 26th session in October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, accepted to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to identify the representatives of its government as the only authentic representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel immediately the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they illegally occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related to it (UNGA, 1971). It also spelt out that China has one solitary seat in the UN, so there is no such thing as two "Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan". The one-China principle signifies the general consensus of the international community; it is constant with the rudimentary norms of global relations. Christensen (2022) noted that to date, over 182 states including Nigeria have set up diplomatic relations with the PRC on the grounds of the one-China principle. In recent years, more and more

countries have elected to break so-called diplomatic ties with Taiwan, reflecting that China's resolve to follow national reunions has been extensively recognized by the international community. In today's world, reunification is in line with the trend of history and the right path, while 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces are a historical trend against the will of the people and a dead end.

Impact of One China Policy on US-China Relations

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 has governed U.S. policy in the absence of a diplomatic affiliation or a defence treaty. The TRA specifies the prospect that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. The TRA stipulates that it is U.S. policy, among others: to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan's future a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States; to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion jeopardizing the security, or social or economic system of Taiwan's people (House International Relations Committee, 2014). The TRA offers a congressional role in shaping security assistance necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability (House International Relations Committee, 2014).

There has been divergence as to whether Taiwan's status was actually decided or determined. In secret talks in 1972, President Nixon assured PRC Premier Zhou Enlai that the United States viewed the status of Taiwan as determined to be part of one China. The PRC's December 1978 statement on the normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States said that the Taiwan question has now been resolved between the two countries. The U.S. statement of December 1978 on normalization stated the expectation that the Taiwan question would be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves (Department of State, 1978). However, the U.S. continues to relate and offer assistance to Taiwan as though it is an independent entity. For instance, the U.S. has granted requests from Taiwan's president to enter the United States for visits or transits; to visit Washington, DC; to hold public events; and to meet with Executive Branch officials and members of Congress. Congress has voiced strong support for granting such visits (Department of State, 1978). In May 1994, the Clinton Administration permitted President Lee Teng-hui to make a refuelling stop and rest in Hawaii but denied

him a visa. In 1995, Lee received a visa to visit Cornell University, his alma mater and Beijing responded with PLA exercises and missile launches in 1995 and 1996. Also, in August 2000, the Clinton Administration allowed the newly-elected President Chen Shui-bian to pass to Los Angeles, but, according to Taiwan's Foreign Ministry, Washington and Taipei had an understanding that Chen would not hold public events.

In 2003, while considering his safety, comfort, convenience, and dignity, the Bush government again approved President Chen's requests for transits to and from Panama through New York (October 31-November 2) and Anchorage (November 4-5) (Richard and Robert, 2009). Some members of Congress personally welcomed Chen, including 16 members who were already in New York and met with him. The United States, with congressional backing, has voiced some support for Taiwan's quest for global space (representation at international organizations), including meaningful participation in certain international organizations on transnational issues. Some supporters view such participation as stabilizing a democratic government's, international presence and promoting the interests of Taiwan's people, while others support Taiwan's separate identity or independence (Richard and Robert, 2009). The Clinton Administration's *1994 Taiwan Policy Review* promised, to support Taiwan's membership in organizations where statehood is not a prerequisite and to support opportunities for Taiwan's voice to be heard in organizations where its membership is not possible.

At its annual meetings in May in Geneva of its governing body, the World Health Assembly (WHA) on May 11, 2001, President Bush wrote to Senator Frank Murkowski, agreeing that the Administration should find opportunities for Taiwan's voice to be heard in the organizations in order to make contribution, even if membership is impossible, including concrete ways for Taiwan to benefit from and contribute to the WHO (WHO, 2001). On April 9, 2002, Representatives in the House formed a Taiwan Caucus, and, as its first action, it wrote a letter on April 19, 2002, to the President, seeking support for Taiwan's participation in the WHO. With worldwide attention on the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson expressed support for Taiwan in a speech at the WHA on May 19, 2003, saying that "the need for effective public health exists among all peoples and that's why the United

States has strongly supported Taiwan's inclusion in efforts against SARS and beyond" (WHO, 2003).

On security, the Bush Administration continued and expanded the closer military ties with Taiwan at different levels. In April 2001, President Bush publicized he would drop the 20-year-old annual arms sales talks used with Taiwan's military in favour of normal, routine considerations of Taiwan's requests when the need arises (Department of States, 2001). Then, the Bush Administration granted a visa for ROC Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming to visit the United States to attend a private conference held by the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council on March 10-12, 2002, in St. Petersburg, making him the first ROC defence minister to come to the United States on a non-transit purpose since 1979 (Kevin, 2016). Also in 2002, the Bush Administration requested legislation to authorize the assignment of personnel from U.S. departments and agencies to AIT, with implications for the assignment of active-duty military personnel to Taiwan for the first time since 1979 (Department of States, 2001). In 2013, the U.S. and the Philippines struck a deal that allowed U.S. forces access to four additional military camps in the Philippines; two of these are near Taiwan, giving the U.S. access to a total of nine military camps (Department of States, 2013). Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said he told China that the military bases available to the U.S. military wouldn't be used for any offensive action, only to aid the Philippines.

Under President Donald Trump, the United States deepened ties with Taiwan by selling more than $18 billion worth of arms to the military and unveiling a $250 million complex for its de facto embassy in Taipei. Recently, President Biden announced a $345 million arms package for Taiwan. The equipment was directly transferred from the Pentagon to Taiwan – the first time this type of transfer has occurred between Taiwan and the U.S. (Department of States, 2023). Taiwan and the U.S. also have a strong economic relationship. Taiwan is the United States' eighth-largest trading partner, and the United States is Taiwan's second-largest trading partner, according to the State Department (Department of States, 2013). Below is a table that depicts the nature of support Taiwan has received from the U.S.

Table one: Visits by U.S. Cabinet-Ranking Officials to Taiwan since 1992

S/N	Year	Ministries/Departments/Agencies
1	1992	U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Carla Hills
2	1994	Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena
3	1996	Small Business Administrator Phil Lader
4	1998	Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson
5	2000	Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater
6	2014	Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Gina McCarthy
7	2017	Secretary of Energy Roberts Jones
8	2022	Representative of the Defense Department Carson Jonah

Source: U.S.-Taiwan Business Council (2022)

From the above, it is glaring that the U.S. is one of the major backers of Taiwan and this has implications for her relations with PRC as it has strained U.S.-China relations at times, as China considers Taiwan a part of its territory and opposes any form of official relations between other countries and Taiwan. China has repeatedly expressed its displeasure with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and other forms of support, viewing them as interference in its internal affairs. China and the U.S. are major trading partners, they are among the big five (Veto power). Ideologically, China and the U.S. seem to be divergent as China is more prone to communism while the U.S. is capitalist in nature. Some scholars such as Heywood (2008) have attributed the continued support of the U.S. to Taiwan as another ideological warfare to undermine the potential powers of China in the Asian continent. Historically, the U.S. has always been wary of the sudden rise of China, allowing China to have control over Taiwan will further lead to the consolidation of China's power thereby threatening the interest of the U.S. in the global system. China has consistently warned against support to Taiwan. On the eve of his visit to Washington, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao warned on November 22, 2003, that China would pay any price to safeguard the unity of the motherland.

The U.S. government attributes frictions over Taiwan to increasingly coercive PRC military and other activities around Taiwan. The U.S. government views such activities as challenging what Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken describes as the

"foundational" understanding in the three joint communiqués: that "any differences regarding Taiwan will be resolved peacefully". In 2022, PRC leader Xi Jinping stated that China would pursue "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but added, that we will never promise to renounce the use of force. The PRC rejects the TRA and the Six Assurances as "unilaterally concocted" and insists that U.S.-China relations must be built on the common understandings of the three joint communiqués (BBC, 2022). The PRC frequently alleges that the United States is violating the understanding in those communiqués, that the United States maintains only unofficial relations with Taiwan. The PRC charges that such alleged violations encourage Taiwan's independence separatist forces (BBC, 2022).

Findings

1. The work observed that though the U.S. recognized only the PRC as the legitimate government in China but still provided massive support; military and trade to Taiwan.
2. The study observed that the U.S. has been providing overt support to Taiwan to ensure that the Taiwan territory is not officially ceded to China to weaken the influence of China in the region and globe in particular.
3. The work observed that the overt support the U.S. provide to Taiwan has strained the relations between China and the U.S. China has vowed to ensure the peaceful unification of the territory without excluding the use of force when necessary

PART IV

Conclusion

The contention over Taiwan is one of the most lingering issues in the international system. Taiwan still refers to itself officially as the ROC. Its president, Tsai Ing-wen, critiques PRC efforts to expunge the sovereignty of the ROC and has indicated that the ROC and the PRC should not be subservient to each other. The One China policy has advanced to cover three issue areas: sovereignty, use of force, and cross-strait dialogue. The inability of the global community to effectively address the issue (one China) is predicated on the interest of certain nations such as the U.S. For the U.S., the One China policy has varied from the PRC's principle on One China and there have been questions about whether U.S.

policy is one of support, non-support, or opposition to unification or independence. In short, U.S. policy has stressed the process (peaceful resolution, cross-strait dialogue, with the agreement of Taiwan's people, and no provocations or unilateral changes by either side) rather than the outcome (e.g., unification, independence, confederation). At the same time, the ROC, or Taiwan, has continued to assert its sovereignty, seeking membership or observership in the United Nations or other international organizations.

According to the U.S. State Department, "Though the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we have a robust unofficial relationship." In 1979, the U.S. established the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the U.S. to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and to sustain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of force that would threaten the security, or the social or economic system, of the people in Taiwan. Meanwhile, Beijing has taken progressively hostile actions, which include flying fighter jets near the island. There is palpable fear that a Chinese attack on Taiwan has the potential to draw the United States into a war with China. However, experts disagree about the likelihood and timing of a Chinese invasion. The top U.S. military commander in the Indo-Pacific warned in 2021 that China could try to invade Taiwan within the next decade (Department of Defence, 2021). Others believe 2049 is a critical date; Xi has highlighted that unification with Taiwan is essential to achieving what he calls "the Chinese Dream", which sees China's great-power status reestablished by 2049. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 reignited the debate; with some analysts arguing that Moscow's moves could bolster Beijing to equally invade Taiwan and others saying that Beijing could become more cautious after witnessing Russia's encounters.

Recommendations

1. The U.S. should cooperate with other countries in the global community to reiterate the position of the United Nations (UN) as it regards one China. This will douse tension over the territory.
2. The U.S. should stop providing overt support to Taiwan, such massive support has emboldened Taiwan to conceive Taiwan as an independent entity.

3. There is a need for China and the U.S. to cooperate and bury the ideological rivalry that hitherto existed between the two countries for the interest of humanity. This can be achieved in an atmosphere of cooperation and respect for international norms.

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