Assessment of Jihadist Attacks and Counter Terrorism by the Government of Niger Republic

By

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Abstract

Jihadist violence in Niger is largely associated with transnational extremist groups such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Boko Haram, and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). These groups exploit local grievances, ethnic tensions, poverty, and weak state presence to recruit fighters and sustain their operations. The study is an assessment of Jihadist attacks and counter-terrorism strategies adopted by the government of Niger Republic. Securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School, particularly Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde was adopted in the study. The theory explains how issues are transformed into matters of "security" through political discourse, thereby justifying extraordinary measures by the state. Secondary method of data collection was utilized. The findings show that Jihadist groups such as IS Sahel and JNIM have carried out frequent attacks on civilians, military personnel, and infrastructure, resulting in significant loss of life and displacement of communities, particularly in Tillabéri, Tahoua, and Diffa regions. Again, while Nigerien armed forces and regional partners

have successfully reclaimed territories and disrupted some extremist networks, the persistence of attacks indicates that military measures alone have not fully eliminated the jihadist threat. The paper recommends that the Nigerien government should continue to enhance coordination between military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies, ensuring rapid response capabilities and improved surveillance in high-risk areas. Again, Niger should deepen collaboration with neighboring countries and international partners to strengthen border security, intelligence sharing, and joint counter-terrorism operations, while addressing transnational networks of extremist financing and logistics.

Keywords: Counter-terrorism, Jihad, Jihadist Attacks, Niger Republic Terrorism, Violence,

Introduction

In recent decades, the Republic of Niger has increasingly become a focal point of jihadist violence within the wider Sahel and West African sub-region. Geographically positioned at the crossroads of North and Sub-Saharan Africa, Niger shares long and porous borders with Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Chad, and Libya, countries that have experienced varying degrees of armed insurgency and political instability. This strategic location, combined with vast ungoverned spaces, weak border control, and long-standing socio-economic challenges, has made Niger vulnerable to the infiltration and expansion of jihadist groups. Since the mid-2010s, the country has witnessed a surge in jihadist attacks, particularly in the Tillabéri, Tahoua, and Diffa regions, posing serious threats to national security, governance, and human security.

According to Military Africa (2025), Jihadist violence in Niger is largely associated with transnational extremist groups such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Boko Haram, and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). These groups exploit local grievances, ethnic tensions, poverty, and weak state presence to recruit fighters and sustain their operations. Attacks have taken the form of ambushes on military bases, assaults on civilian communities, kidnappings, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and targeted killings of traditional leaders and local officials. The increasing sophistication and frequency of these attacks have resulted in

significant loss of lives, destruction of property, mass displacement of civilians, and disruption of livelihoods, particularly in rural and border communities.

Aamoum (2019) asserts that in response to the escalating threat, the Government of Niger has adopted a range of counterterrorism measures aimed at containing and reducing jihadist activities. These measures include the deployment of military forces to affected regions, the declaration of states of emergency, the strengthening of border security, and the enhancement of intelligence-gathering capabilities. Niger has also played an active role in regional and international security frameworks, such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), reflecting the recognition that jihadist violence transcends national boundaries and requires collective action. Support from international partners, including France, the United States, and the European Union, has further shaped Niger's counterterrorism approach through training, logistics, and financial assistance.

Despite these efforts, jihadist attacks have continued to pose a persistent challenge to the Nigerien state. The effectiveness of government counterterrorism strategies has been questioned in light of recurring attacks, civilian casualties, allegations of human rights abuses by security forces, and the limited impact of military operations on the long-term drivers of extremism. Additionally, political instability, economic hardship, climate-induced resource scarcity, and governance deficits have complicated counterterrorism efforts, sometimes undermining public trust and cooperation with state authorities. These dynamics suggest that counterterrorism in Niger is not solely a military issue but also a governance and development challenge.

Against this backdrop, an assessment of jihadist attacks and the counterterrorism responses of the Government of Niger Republic is both timely and necessary. Understanding the patterns, causes, and impacts of jihadist violence, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of state responses, is crucial for evaluating current policies and identifying areas for improvement. This study therefore seeks to provide a systematic analysis of jihadist attacks in Niger and the government's counterterrorism strategies, with the aim of contributing to academic discourse,

informing policy formulation, and supporting more effective and sustainable approaches to security and stability in Niger and the wider Sahel region.

Statement of the Problem

The Republic of Niger has, in recent years, become one of the epicentres of jihadist violence in the Sahel region, experiencing frequent attacks by extremist groups such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), and Boko Haram factions operating in the Diffa and Tillabéri regions. These attacks have resulted in significant loss of lives, destruction of public infrastructure, mass displacement of civilians, and the erosion of state authority in affected areas. Despite the adoption of various counter-terrorism measures by the Government of Niger, including military offensives, states of emergency, regional security cooperation, and partnerships with international allies, jihadist violence has persisted and, in some regions, intensified.

Although the Nigerien government has invested heavily in security operations and participated actively in regional frameworks such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force and multinational counter-terrorism initiatives, questions remain regarding the effectiveness, sustainability, and overall impact of these strategies. Reports of recurring attacks, ambushes on security forces, and the continued expansion of jihadist influence in rural communities suggest gaps between policy intentions and on-ground outcomes. Furthermore, limited state presence, poor intelligence penetration, weak socio-economic conditions, and strained civil-military relations have complicated counter-terrorism efforts.

Military Africa (2025) who conducted a study on counter-terrorism in the Sahel often adopt a broad regional focus, paying limited attention to Niger's specific institutional responses, local dynamics, and policy implementation challenges. As a result, there is insufficient empirical assessment of how government strategies have addressed the root causes of jihadist violence, protected civilians, and restored long-term stability. This gap in knowledge hinders evidence-based policy formulation and limits the ability of stakeholders to design effective and context-specific counter-terrorism interventions.

Therefore, the problem this study seeks to address is the lack of a comprehensive assessment of jihadist attacks in Niger Republic and the effectiveness of government counter-terrorism measures in mitigating these threats. By critically examining the patterns of jihadist violence and evaluating state responses, this study aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the challenges confronting Niger's counter-terrorism efforts and to propose informed strategies for improving national and regional security.

Conceptual Framework

Jihad

The concept of Jihad is one of the most discussed and often misunderstood ideas in Islamic thought. According to Aji & Fajria (2018), linguistically, the word Jihad is derived from the Arabic root Jahada, which means to strive, struggle or exert effort. In its original and broader sense, jihad refers to any sincere effort made by a Muslim to live according to the will of God (Allah) and to promote moral uprightness, justice, and peace in society. It is therefore not limited to warfare, as is commonly portrayed in popular media and political discourse.

Albert (2021) argues that in Islamic theology, jihad has both spiritual and practical dimensions. The most fundamental form is often described as the greater Jihad, which involves the internal struggle against sin, moral weakness, selfish desires and wrongdoing. This personal and ethical struggle is aimed at self-purification, discipline, and moral improvement. It emphasizes values such as patience, honesty, compassion, humility, and social responsibility. For many Islamic scholars, this internal striving represents the core meaning of jihad and is a lifelong obligation for every Muslim.

Alongside this spiritual dimension, Bala (2021) asserts that Jihad can also have a social and communal aspect. This includes efforts to promote justice, protect the oppressed, support social welfare, and resist injustice through peaceful means such as teaching, charity, dialogue, and lawful civic engagement. In this sense, jihad encompasses activities like educating others, helping the poor, speaking out against corruption, and working toward social reform. These non-violent forms of jihad are widely recognized in classical and contemporary Islamic scholarship.

Baylis (2022) argues that the most controversial interpretation of jihad relates to its military or armed dimension, sometimes referred to as the Lesser Jihad. Classical Islamic jurisprudence permits armed struggle only under strict conditions, such as self-defence, protection of religious freedom, or resistance against oppression and aggression. Even then, Islamic law places clear ethical limits on warfare, including the prohibition of targeting civilians, women, children, non-combatants, and religious institutions. Armed jihad is therefore not an open-ended license for violence but a regulated and conditional action governed by moral and legal principles.

Jihadist Attacks

Bernburg (2022) submits that Jihadist attacks refer to acts of violence carried out by individuals or groups who claim ideological justification from extremist interpretations of Jihad within Islam. In contemporary security and political discourse, the term "jihadist" is used to describe militant actors who advocate or employ armed violence as a means of pursuing political, religious, or territorial objectives, often targeting states, civilians, and international interests. These attacks are typically associated with transnational extremist movements such as Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State (IS), and their regional affiliates.

Botha & Abdile (2024) argue that Jihadist attacks are characterized by the deliberate use of terror to instill fear, destabilize governments, and undermine social cohesion. They commonly take forms such as suicide bombings, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, armed assaults, kidnappings, assassinations, and raids on military installations or civilian settlements. Unlike conventional warfare, jihadist violence is often asymmetric, relying on surprise, mobility, and exploitation of weak state presence, particularly in fragile and conflict-prone regions.

Ideologically, Borum (2021) enthuse that Jihadist attacks are rooted in radical narratives that frame violence as a religious obligation or defensive struggle against perceived oppression, foreign influence, or un-Islamic governance. These narratives are typically constructed through selective and distorted interpretations of religious texts, combined with political grievances such as marginalization, poverty, state repression, and foreign military intervention. As a result, jihadist

attacks are not purely religious phenomena but are deeply intertwined with socio-economic, political, and governance failures.

Terrorism

Buzan (2020) argues that terrorism is a complex and contested concept that generally refers to the use or threat of violence by non-state or, in some cases, state actors to achieve political, ideological, religious or social objectives through fear and intimidation. While definitions vary across scholars, governments, and international organizations, terrorism is commonly characterized by its deliberate targeting of civilians or non-combatants and its intention to influence a wider audience beyond the immediate victims.

At its core, Culp (2021) argues that terrorism involves planned acts of violence such as bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, arson, or mass shootings, carried out to coerce governments, societies, or international bodies into making political or ideological concessions. Unlike conventional warfare, terrorism relies on asymmetry, meaning perpetrators often lack the military strength to confront states directly and instead use fear as a strategic tool to magnify their impact.

According to Byman (2025), a defining feature of terrorism is its psychological dimension. The primary objective is not only physical destruction but also the creation of widespread fear, insecurity, and uncertainty within a population. By attacking symbolic targets such as public places, government institutions, religious centers, or critical infrastructure, terrorists seek to undermine public confidence in the state's ability to provide security and governance.

Counter Terrorism

Dietrich (2021) asserts that counter-terrorism refers to the policies, strategies, measures and actions adopted by states and international actors to prevent, deter, respond to and combat terrorism. It encompasses a broad range of military, legal, political, economic, intelligence, and social initiatives designed to neutralize terrorist threats, dismantle terrorist organizations, protect civilians, and maintain national and international security.

At its core, in the words of Ewa (2021), counter-terrorism involves preventing terrorist acts before they occur, responding effectively when attacks happen, and addressing the underlying conditions that enable terrorism to thrive. Traditional counter-terrorism approaches emphasize hard security measures, such as military operations, intelligence gathering, surveillance, border control, and law enforcement actions aimed at arresting, prosecuting, or eliminating terrorists. These measures seek to disrupt terrorist networks, cut off funding sources, and deny terrorists safe havens.

Eze & Hettmann (2020) assert that modern understandings of counter-terrorism have expanded beyond purely military responses to include soft approaches that focus on prevention and long-term stability. These include counter-radicalization programs, deradicalization and rehabilitation initiatives, community engagement, strategic communication, and efforts to counter extremist ideologies. Such approaches recognize that terrorism often feeds on grievances such as poverty, marginalization, political exclusion, and weak governance, and therefore requires comprehensive solutions.

Theoretical Framework: Securitization Theory

Securitization Theory provides a useful framework for understanding both jihadist attacks and counter-terrorism efforts in the Niger Republic. Developed by the Copenhagen School, particularly Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde in (1998), the theory explains how issues are transformed into matters of "security" through political discourse, thereby justifying extraordinary measures by the state. In the context of Niger, jihadist violence has been securitized by the government as an existential threat to national survival, territorial integrity, and public safety, shaping the country's counter-terrorism responses.

Aamoum (2019) argues that Jihadist attacks in Niger, especially in regions such as Tillabéri, Tahoua, and Diffa, are carried out by groups linked to the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Boko Haram, and Al-Qaeda-affiliated networks. These attacks target military installations, civilians, humanitarian workers, and government infrastructure, aiming to undermine state authority and create zones of ungoverned space. From a securitization perspective, such attacks are framed not merely as criminal acts but as existential threats to the Nigerien state, its

sovereignty, and social cohesion. The repeated nature and brutality of the attacks have enabled political leaders and security elites to present terrorism as a supreme danger requiring urgent and exceptional responses.

The Nigerien government acts as the primary "securitizing actor" by publicly declaring jihadist violence a national security emergency. Aji & Fajria (2018) submit that through official speeches, policy statements, and emergency declarations, the government portrays terrorism as a threat that transcends normal political and legal concerns. This discourse has gained acceptance among domestic audiences and international partners, thereby fulfilling one of the core conditions of securitization: audience endorsement. Once accepted, the government is able to justify extraordinary counter-terrorism measures that would otherwise be controversial in normal political conditions.

Jihadist Attacks in Niger Republic

Albert (2021) asserts that Jihadist attacks in the Niger Republic refer to violent actions carried out by extremist groups that claim ideological justification from radical interpretations of jihad, targeting the state, civilians, security forces, and international actors. Although Niger was once considered relatively stable within the Sahel, the country has increasingly become a frontline state in the broader regional jihadist insurgency since the mid-2010s. Its strategic geographic location, sharing long, porous borders with Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Chad, Libya, and Algeria, has exposed it to transnational militant movements operating across West and Central Africa.

Bala (2021) submits that the most prominent jihadist groups responsible for attacks in Niger include the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), factions affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram–linked groups operating around the Lake Chad Basin. These groups exploit weak border controls, difficult terrain, limited state presence in rural areas, and local grievances to establish operational bases and conduct attacks. Jihadist violence has been particularly concentrated in the Tillaberi Tahoua and Diffa regions, where attacks have taken the form of ambushes on military convoys, raids on villages, suicide bombings, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations of community leaders and government officials.

Baylis (2022) opines that Jihadist attacks in Niger are not only military in nature but also deeply embedded in social and political contexts. Militants often exploit longstanding issues such as poverty, unemployment, marginalization of peripheral communities, competition over land and water resources, and inter-communal tensions. By presenting themselves as protectors or alternative authorities, jihadist groups seek to gain local support or at least acquiescence, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the Nigerien state. Civilians have increasingly become victims of these attacks, leading to mass displacement, humanitarian crises, and the disruption of livelihoods, education, and health services.

Botha & Abdile (2024) argue that the escalation of jihadist attacks has posed serious threats to Niger's national security and regional stability. Security forces have suffered significant casualties, and repeated assaults on military bases have exposed gaps in intelligence, logistics, and rapid response capabilities. At the same time, attacks on civilians have eroded public trust in the state's ability to provide security. The presence of foreign military forces and international counterterrorism partners has further internationalized the conflict, making Niger both a target and a key actor in global counterterrorism efforts.

Overall, Borum (2021) submits that jihadist attacks in the Niger Republic represent a complex and evolving security challenge driven by a combination of ideological extremism, transnational militancy, weak governance, and socio-economic vulnerability. Understanding the nature, causes, and patterns of these attacks is essential for assessing the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies adopted by the Nigerien government and for designing sustainable responses that go beyond military solutions to address the root causes of insecurity.

According to Bulama (2022), recent and notable Jihadist attacks in Niger Republic are captures below:

i. In March 2025, armed militants affiliated with Islamic State – Sahel Province attacked a mosque in Fambita, Kokorou (Tillaberi Region) during Ramadan prayers, killing at least 44 civilians and injuring others, and burning markets and homes.

ii. Also, on June 20, 2025, jihadists struck the village of Manda (Tillaberi Region), killing at least 71 civilians during a nighttime massacre, part of ongoing extremist violence in western Niger.
iii. Again, around December 10, 2024, militants believed to be from IS Sahel ambushed and defeated Nigerien soldiers in Chetoumane (Tillaberi Rgion), reportedly killing around 90 soldiers and over 50 civilians in one of the deadliest attacks on Niger's security forces.
iv. In March 2024, jihadists ambushed a Nigerien military convoy between Teguey and Bankilare (Tillaberi Region), killing at least 23 soldiers and wounding others as armed groups expanded aggression across the western border area.
v. Earlier in the insurgency, on October 6, 2016, militants carried out the Tazalit attack on a refugee camp near the Mali border, killing 22 Nigerien soldiers and seizing vehicles and supplies, one of the early major strikes against Nigerien forces by jihadist fighters.
vi. Also, in August 2021, unidentified jihadist assailants attacked a mosque in Theim (Tilaberi Region) during Friday prayers, killing at least 17 people as part of a broader pattern of extremist violence targeting civilians.
vii. Lastly, according to conflict monitoring sources, jihadist groups such as IS Sahel and JNIM have carried out multiple ambushes, civilian killings and coordinated assaults on security posts, villages, and transport convoys along the volatile Tillabéri region, often resulting in significant loss of life and insecurity.

Counter-Terrorism Measures Adopted by the Nigerien State to Curb Jihadist Attacks

Buzan (2020) asserts that the Republic of Niger has faced persistent jihadist threats over the past decade, with extremist groups such as Islamic State in the Sahel Province (IS Sahel) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM) operating in the western and southern regions of the country. These groups have carried out attacks on civilians, military personnel, and infrastructure, destabilizing local communities and undermining national security. In response, the Nigerien state has implemented a range of counter-terrorism measures aimed at curbing these attacks and restoring stability. Central to these efforts has been the deployment of the national military to high-risk areas such as Tillabéri, Tahoua, and the Diffa

region. Byman (2025) submits that the Nigerien armed forces have conducted patrols, established military checkpoints, and launched targeted offensives against insurgent camps, seeking to degrade the operational capacity of jihadist groups. Specialized counter-terrorism units have been trained to respond rapidly to ambushes, kidnappings, and terrorist incursions, and aerial support, including surveillance drones and airstrikes, has been employed to enhance operational effectiveness.

Culp (2021) submits that recognizing the transnational nature of jihadist activity, Niger has actively engaged in regional cooperation, particularly through its participation in the G5 Sahel Joint Force alongside Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and Mauritania. Through this collaboration, Niger has shared intelligence, coordinated cross-border operations, and participated in joint military drills to secure the porous borders that extremists frequently exploit. These regional efforts are complemented by legal and policy measures within the country. Dietrich (2021) argues that the government has declared states of emergency in affected regions, enabling the temporary expansion of military authority, and has strengthened anti-terrorism legislation to facilitate the prosecution of suspects and the disruption of terrorist financing networks. Measures to regulate arms trafficking and reinforce border security have also been prioritized to reduce the flow of weapons to militant groups.

Gartenstein-Ross, Barr & Moreng (2021) submit that beyond military and legal strategies, Niger has invested in community engagement and counter-radicalization initiatives. Programs aimed at deradicalizing and reintegrating repentant militants into society have been introduced, alongside efforts to involve local communities in monitoring and reporting suspicious activities. Public awareness campaigns educate citizens on the dangers of extremist recruitment, fostering cooperation with security agencies. Dietrich (2021) submits that recognizing that socio-economic deprivation can fuel extremism, the Nigerien government has also implemented humanitarian and development measures to stabilize communities. Assistance to internally displaced persons, infrastructure development, and livelihood programs seek to reduce the vulnerabilities that jihadist groups exploit, while collaboration with non-governmental organizations

ensures access to education, healthcare, and other essential services in affected regions.

Eze & Hettmann (2020) submits that while these counter-terrorism measures have yielded some successes, including the disruption of terrorist networks and a reduction in large-scale attacks in certain areas, challenges remain. The resilience and adaptability of jihadist groups, limited resources, difficult terrain, and porous borders continue to complicate security operations. Nonetheless, the Nigerien state's multidimensional approach, combining military action, regional cooperation, legal reform, community engagement, and socio-economic development, demonstrates a comprehensive effort to combat jihadist attacks and promote long-term stability in the country. This integrated strategy underscores the importance of addressing not only the immediate security threat but also the underlying conditions that facilitate the spread of extremist violence. The counter-terrorism approach adopted by the Nigerien government to curb Jihadist attacks can be summed as follows:

Military operations: Eze & Hettmann (2020) espouse that Niger has deployed its national armed forces to combat insurgent groups in the Tillaberi, Tahoua and Dffa regions, which are hotspots for jihadist activity. This led to increased military presence and patrols in vulnerable border areas as well as joint operations with foreign military allies, such as French forces under Operation Barkhane (until 2022) and support from U.S. and European partners for surveillance and logistics. These operations aim to degrade the operational capacity of jihadist groups and reclaim territories they occupy or threaten.

Regional cooperation: Dietrich (2021) asserts that recognizing the transnational nature of jihadist threats, Niger has actively participated in regional security frameworks. The G5 Sahel Joint Force which is a coalition of Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and Mauritania has helped Niger in a coordinated counter-terrorism operations across porous borders.

Legal and policy measures: Bernburg (2022) submits that the government has adopted legal and administrative frameworks to enhance counter-terrorism capabilities through the declaration of state of emergency in insurgency-prone

regions, enabling the temporary expansion of military authority. Also, there has been strengthening of anti-terrorism laws to prosecute suspects and disrupt terrorist financing networks.

Community engagement and counter-radicalization: Borum (2021) posits that Niger has recognized that military action alone cannot eliminate the threat. As such, some initiatives have been adopted to also help in the counter-terrorism drive. These initiatives include deradicalization and reintegration programmes for repentant militants, community policing and local vigilante support, especially in rural villages, to monitor suspicious activities and public awareness campaigns to educate citizens about jihadist recruitment tactics and encourage cooperation with security agencies.

Humanitarian and socio-economic measures: Aamoum (2019) points out that acknowledging that instability fuels recruitment, the government has combined security measures with development initiatives to boost the counter-terrorism approach. These initiatives include support for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps and safe zones, infrastructure and livelihood projects to reduce poverty in affected regions, aiming to reduce the appeal of jihadist recruitment and lastly, collaboration with NGOs to provide education and healthcare, stabilizing communities and undermining extremist influence.

Findings/Conclusion

Jihadist attacks in the Niger Republic represent a complex and evolving security challenge driven by a combination of ideological extremism, transnational militancy, weak governance, and socio-economic vulnerability. Understanding the nature, causes, and patterns of these attacks is essential for assessing the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies adopted by the Nigerien government and for designing sustainable responses that go beyond military solutions to address the root causes of insecurity.

From the study, it be found that Jihadist groups such as IS Sahel and JNIM have carried out frequent attacks on civilians, military personnel, and infrastructure, resulting in significant loss of life and displacement of communities, particularly in Tillabéri, Tahoua, and Diffa regions. Again, while Nigerien armed forces and

regional partners have successfully reclaimed territories and disrupted some extremist networks, the persistence of attacks indicates that military measures alone have not fully eliminated the jihadist threat.

Participation in the G5 Sahel Joint Force has enhanced intelligence sharing, cross-border coordination, and joint operations, contributing to some successes in curbing jihadist mobility and operational capacity. Poverty, limited education, and weak state presence in rural areas have facilitated recruitment by extremist groups, highlighting that counter-terrorism efforts need to address underlying socio-economic factors, not just military threats.

Recommendations

The following have been recommended:

- The Nigerien government should continue to enhance coordination between military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies, ensuring rapid response capabilities and improved surveillance in high-risk areas.
- Niger should deepen collaboration with neighboring countries and international partners to strengthen border security, intelligence sharing, and joint counter-terrorism operations, while addressing transnational networks of extremist financing and logistics.
- The government should support programs that deradicalize and reintegrate former militants, engage local communities in monitoring and reporting suspicious activities, and foster public awareness about the dangers of extremism.
- Development initiatives targeting education, healthcare, infrastructure, and livelihood opportunities in insurgency-prone regions should be prioritized to reduce vulnerability to extremist recruitment and enhance long-term stability.

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